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Abstract:
In Belgium welfare agencies are subsidized to employ welfare recipients for a period
sufficiently long to entitle them to benefits of the contributory social insurance program.
This type of employment is called Social Employment (SE).  This paper investigates the
effect of  SE on the exit rate from welfare.  We extend the minimum chi-square approach
of Cockx (1995) for grouped duration data to deal with selection into SE at any instant
during the welfare spell.  Moreover, we introduce a specification error as in Amemiya
and Nold (1975) to account for omitted variables, which may be correlated with the
selection into SE. We show that a variable  that is not correlated with  the omitted
variables, but affects the probability of selection into SE identifies the SE-effect, and we
propose a consistent estimator of this effect that is free of selection bias. We argue that
region is such a variable, because in Belgium regional governments determine the subsidy
for SE, which  affects  the participation rate in SE by some political  process without
consideration of the average characteristics of the welfare recipients in their region. The
empirical analysis discovers creaming in the selection process.  Without correction for
selectivity we find that SE reduces welfare dependency.  After correction this conclusion
is reversed. These results are in line with the incentives faced by the welfare agencies,
that administer the program.
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1. Introduction
In Belgium the welfare system is a safety net for those who for some reason are not
covered by social insurance and whose income  falls  short of the legally  determined
minimum, the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG)1 . If they pass a means test, individuals
in need can claim a supplement to their income up to the MIG level at the welfare agency
(WA)2  of their municipality. Legislation stipulates that these WA's may employ welfare
recipients in order to entitle them to social insurance benefits. In particular, if this
employment lasts sufficiently long it entitles the employee to unemployment benefits. This
paper evaluates this employment by the WA, which is referred to as social employment
(SE).
SE can be viewed as a type of subsidized employment, be it a rather special one.
There is evidence (see Bassi and Ashenfelter 1986, Ridder 1986, Gueron 1990, Gueron
and Pauly 1991, Moffitt 1992, Bell and Orr 1994) that subsidized employment can realize
substantial economic benefits in the form of increased earnings and employment rates and
lower welfare dependency for participants3 . Sufficient training and assistance seem to be
requirements  for success though (Gueron 1990, p.91-93). Moreover, as subsidized
employment is expensive these studies are not conclusive regarding its cost effectiveness.
Evaluation studies of SE in Belgium are consistent with these findings, as they conclude
that SE only has positive employment effects, if the participants are assisted and trained
during employment. However, these studies have methodological flaws, that make it hard
to draw firm conclusions.
Van de Velde (1990) reports poor results for SE. She found that in 1986 only 8%
of the participants held a regular job immediately after SE. The remainder became entitled
to a social insurance allowance. Moreover, in total 48% remained unemployed during all
3 years after SE. This finding  need not be in conflict with the evidence cited above,
because in 1986 SE was hardly accompanied by any assistance or training. A problem
with her analysis is that  she did not compare these fractions with those for non-
participants. Therefore, it is conceivable that the employment rate was even smaller for
the latter group. More recent research by Dehaes (1994) finds that participants in SE are
indeed more likely to leave welfare. However, that study does not correct for the biases
induced by sample design4  and treatment selection.
Correction for the latter bias is essential.  Participants in SE have different
characteristics than non-participants. Garcia (1990) finds that participants are younger,
more educated and have more labor market experience than non-participants.  Moreover,
the WA may select participants on the basis of characteristics, which we, as researchers,
can not observe.  To the extent that the researcher fails to correct for these differences,
the observed effect may merely reflect these differences, instead of the effect of SE.
One evaluation study makes an attempt to correct for selective  participation.
Wouters, Van Meensel and Nicaise (1994) evaluate pilot projects in which training and
intensive assistance complement SE. By matching participants and non-participants on a
number of observable characteristics, they try to minimize the effect of selection into the
                                               
1  "het Bestaansminimum" / "le Minimex".
2  "het OCMW" / "le CPAS".
3  Ridder studies Dutch programs. All other studies evaluate US programs.
4  In particular, she did not take the length-biased nature of the sample into account , nor did she
adequately treat individuals experiencing multiple welfare spells.-3- 3
programs. Program participants are found to have  higher employment rates than non-
participants, even in the long run.
In the present study we try to deal with the biases that have affected previous
evaluations of SE. We estimate the impact of SE on the propensity to leave welfare.  In
order to avoid misinterpretation, it is important to realize that exit out of welfare can be
to a number of destinations.  We can deduce from the findings of Dehaes (1994, p. 119
and 128) that 26% of the terminations are due to a change in labor market status5 , 35%
to entitlement to other social benefits, 19% to moving to another municipality, 11% to a
change in the family composition6 , 4% to the WA challenging the entitlement to welfare
and finally 4% to other reasons.  Our data do not allow us to distinguish between these
various exits. Hence, a positive effect of SE on the total exit rate from welfare need not
correspond to a larger transition rate into employment outside the WA.   
           We have to allow for the possibility of selective participation in SE. Recent
research (see LaLonde 1986 or Fraker and Maynard 1987) has thrown doubt on the
capacity of non-experimental methods to correct for selection bias. Estimates are found
to be sensitive to model specification and estimation method. This line of research asserts
that the selection bias can only be controlled for if one disposes of data emerging from an
experiment.
Experiments can be controlled or natural  (cf. Angrist 1992).  They are controlled
if they are designed by researchers in an attempt to uncover causal relationships either by
controlling  the  environment or by randomizing the  intervention of interest. Natural
experiments usually are not generated for research purposes, but are the by-product of
some exogenous change in the assignment  process.  In controlled experiments there
remains a risk of biased treatment effects (cf.  Burtless and Orr 1986 or Heckman 1992),
because the experiment interferes with the normal operation of the program. This critique
does not apply to natural experiments.  The analysis of natural experiments has therefore
been advocated in the recent evaluation literature (cf. Krueger 1990, Meyer 1989, and
Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin 1990, Angrist 1990, Angrist and Krueger 1991, Imbens and
Van der Klaauw 1993, Imbens and Angrist 1994 and Card and Krueger 1994). Meyer
(1995) gives an extensive discussion of the role of experiments in the evaluation of social
programs.
Angrist (1992, p.1-3) distinguishes  between  two types of natural experiments.
The first type exploits unusual institutions or circumstances that lead to an exogenous
manipulation of the treatment assignment. The second type of natural experiment is a
change in policy.  One collects data before and after a new policy has been implemented
and hopes that the policy change is the only change that has occurred.
As we show below,  the  subsidy  for SE differs  between regions and between
municipalities of different population size. If it is true that the subsidy levels differ as a
consequence of a political process that sets these levels without taking the probability of
leaving welfare into account, then this process induces a natural experiment of the first
type. There is variation in the assignment to the treatment group which is unrelated to the
outcome of interest, the probability of leaving welfare.
Krueger (1990), Meyer (1989), and Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1990) analyzed
duration data that were generated by a natural experiment. Their approach can not be
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used in the evaluation of SE.  First, because censoring is important and we must allow for
observed differences, parametric distributional assumptions are needed in their approach
(see Krueger 1990, p.14). Therefore, the critique of LaLonde (1986) and Fraker and
Maynard (1987) applies. Second, their approach can not account for selection into SE
during welfare spells. They assume that individuals are selected into the treatment group
prior to entry into the state of interest, in our case welfare. WA's, however, employ and
therefore select welfare recipients at some instant during the welfare spell.
To avoid restrictive distributional assumptions we discretize the data and employ
a flexible specification for discrete duration data, as used in Cockx (1995). We explicitly
allow  for  unobservable  variables. If these unobservable variables are correlated  with
participation in SE, there is selective participation.  If there is variation in the rate of
participation, that is independent of the variation in the probability of leaving welfare, the
true effect of SE is still identifiable. The flexible discrete duration model can easily allow
for competing risks. This is important to deal with selection into SE during welfare, and
with censoring of SE and welfare spells. An additional advantage of  the flexible discrete
duration model is that it can be estimated with (weighted) least squares, so that it can be
used with large data sets, as the administrative records analyzed in this study.
In the following section we discuss the main features of SE.  In Section 3 we
explain the nature of the natural experiment. The following section describes the data.
Section 5 presents the benchmark model that we use to estimate the effect of SE on the
welfare spells.  Section 6 discusses the robustness of the results.  The final  section
contains the conclusions.
2. The Main Features of Social Employment
The law of July 1976 regarding the WA's in Belgium stipulates that an WA may  employ
an individual with an employment record that is insufficient to qualify for social benefits,
more specifically unemployment benefits derived from the contributory social insurance
system. Unemployment benefits are only paid to workers who, within a specified period
prior to their claim, have been  employed for at least 75 days if younger than 18, and up
to 600 days if older than 50 (Van Langendonck 1991, p. 450).
The possibility to employ welfare recipients for this purpose brought legislation
into agreement with the principle that social assistance offers relief only if the main social
insurance system fails to do so.  The national and regional7  authorities have gradually
widened the scope of  SE to a means of enhancing the socio-professional integration of
the poor.  This  was reflected in increasing  levels of financial support.  The regional
authorities subsidize SE in Flanders since 1983 and in the Walloon provinces since 1989.
The central authorities finance 50% of the MIG paid by the local WA.  Since 1985 the
WA remains entitled to this subsidy if it socially employs the welfare recipient, and since
January 1993 the subsidy is up to 100% of the MIG.
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SE was not only stimulated by increased financial support.  During 1987 and 1988
the federal minister of social integration launched a number of pilot projects to investigate
whether SE could enhance the socio-professional integration of the poor (see Caymax,
1988,  Dechamps,  1988 and Lescrauwaet, 1988).  Based on the conclusions of this
research and on the observation that participants in SE often returned to unemployment
(Van de Velde 1990),  new projects that provided intensive assistance and training on the
job, were initiated in 1989 (Van Meensel and Heeman 1992).  The scale of these projects
was gradually increased over time.  By 1993 10% of the Belgian welfare agencies was
involved in these projects.  The participating welfare agencies accounted for more than
20% of the welfare population (Wouters, Van Meensel and Nicaise 1994, p.1-2).
Van de Velde (1989) demonstrates  that SE is concentrated in the community
services that the WA offers to the general public.  These community services consist of
domestic  services to households, such as care,  meal  provision,  cleaning,  and to
institutions,  i.e. nurseries, hospitals, elderly  homes,  etc.  These jobs require few
qualifications. Women are typically (95%) employed in the domestic services provided by
the WA. This work involves cleaning, cooking, washing and ironing.  Men are required
to do all kinds of odd jobs (37%), to maintain roads or to plant vegetation (13%), to help
in the kitchen (10%), to do administrative work (10%) (see Van de Velde, p.55).  The
work is typically remunerated at the minimum wage. It should be noted that employment
is mandatory since the receipt of welfare benefits is conditional on the willingness to
work.
WA's can save on outlays by employing welfare recipients.   An example clarifies
this point8 .  Consider a welfare recipient living alone somewhere in Flanders in January
1989.  The net monthly cost of SE for this individual is the cost of the minimum wage for
the employer (=49,354 Belgian Francs) minus the central authorities’ subsidy amounting
to 50% of the MIG (=8,152 BF) and the regional authorities’ subsidy (=30,500 BF):
10,702 BF.  Moreover, during  the initial  period of SE,  during  which  the  participant
would otherwise depend on welfare, the WA no longer needs to pay welfare benefits and
therefore saves additionally at least9  50% of the MIG (=8,152 BF) minus the regional
subsidy for welfare (=1,141 BF), that is 7,011 BF.  This implies that employing a worker
who initially produces goods and services with a value of more than 3,691 BF per month
and later on of more than 10,702 BF per month, in SE is financially attractive to the WA.
The WA need not worry about costs after SE, because after SE welfare recipients are
entitled to social insurance benefits, and hence will not depend financially on the WA. We
conclude that SE can result in savings for WA's.  These savings are larger if the WA
"creams" the most productive recipients for participation in the program.
This  observation is not  only valid for the specific example. However, the
magnitude of the savings differs with the level of the MIG10 , the time period and the
region.  For instance, Brussels does not provide a specific subsidy for SE and due to the
growing success of the program in Flanders  the  level of the  subsidy  per  participant
declined over time.  In the case of a lower subsidy the WA can maintain savings by being
more selective in the  choice of participants. The specific subsidy rules provide no
incentive to the WA to use SE as a means to integrate welfare recipients in the labor
                                               
8  The figures in the example are taken from an internal document of a WA to which we had access.
9  WA's can offer a supplement to the MIG financed out of their own means.
10  The level of the MIG is different according to household type.  Legislation distinguishes between
singles living alone, singles living with dependent children, cohabiting individuals and  cohabiting
married couples.-6- 6
market.  Any effort to this effect will only increase its expenditures. Consequently, the
findings of Van de Velde (1990, p. iv),  that SE was hardly accompanied by training and
assistance and that the WA's encouraged only 6% of the participants to apply for another
job, are not surprising.
On the basis of these observations, we conclude that one can hardly expect SE to
enhance integration and to reduce welfare dependency.  The new programs introduced
in January 1989, in which SE is supplemented by intensive assistance and training may
have different effects.  However,  since participation by WA’s in these programs is
voluntary, they are unlikely to be implemented by a majority of the WA's as long as
subsidy rules allow WA's to save on outlays by hampering the professional integration.
In the remainder of this study we investigate whether these claims are supported by the
data.
3. Exogenous Variation in Participation
In the introduction we mentioned  that in Belgium  the  regional  authorities provide
specific subsidies for SE of welfare recipients. These subsidies differ between regions. In
this section we show that these differences induce differences in participation rates in SE
between regions. Moreover, we shall argue that the levels of the subsidy are exogenously
determined, i.e. that they are determined without taking the exit rate from welfare into
account. Hence, the variation in the participation rate by region can be considered to be
induced by a natural experiment.
In order to understand the subsidy mechanism it is important to note that the
provision of community services is the responsibility of the regional authorities.  SE is
regarded as a community service offered to welfare recipients.  The regional authorities
dispose of a fund11  from which particular community services provided by the WA's of a
region are paid for. This fund is financed out of  national tax proceeds.  Its size is set
according to fixed rules and it is distributed between the regions according to objective
criteria as the size of the area, the size of the population and the tax proceeds in the
region.  The regional authorities cannot influence the size of this fund.  They can only
decide on the way in which they allocate  this fund to the different types of community
services offered by the WA's.
SE is one type of community service that is subsidized out of this fund. Table 1
indicates how the proportion12  of the budget allocated to SE differs between Brussels,
Flanders and the Walloon provinces for the 1986-92 period.  Note that Brussels provides
no specific subsidy to SE.
INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
From this table we conclude that the fraction of the regional fund allocated to SE
is larger in Flanders than in the Walloon Provinces and that the fraction in the Walloon
Provinces in turn is larger than in Brussels. According to Cockx (1995) welfare
recipients living in Brussels are most likely to exit from welfare, followed respectively by
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those living in Flanders and in the Walloon Provinces. Hence, the fraction allocated to
SE is certainly not positively related to the exit rate from welfare.
There are further reasons to believe that the political process sets subsidy levels
independently of the  exit  rate  from welfare. First, the  regional  authorities  are not
financially responsible for the benefits paid to welfare recipients. This is a responsibility
of the national and the municipal authorities.  So, even if one believes that SE can save
outlays on welfare by reducing the length of welfare spells, regional governments have
no financial incentive to stimulate SE to realize these savings.
On the other hand, the SE-subsidy can be seen as a subsidy aimed at fighting
poverty. However, SE is one of many community services that can be used to this effect.
Hence, even if the choice of the regional authorities is influenced by the extent of poverty
in their region (which remains to be proven) and therefore by the exit rate from welfare,
the  decision to subsidize SE rather than other community  services depends on the
perceived relative costs and  benefits of the various programs. It is hard to believe that
the relative costs (and the relative effects on the size of the welfare population13 ) differ
much between the regions, and hence the variation in the fraction allocated to SE must
reflect  the political  preference  for SE in the regions, i.e. exogenous variation in the
perceived  attractiveness of SE as a means to reduce poverty. We conclude that the
fraction of the regional fund allocated to SE is determined independently of  the outcome
of interest in this study, the probability of leaving welfare.  On the other hand, because of
the savings that the WA's can realize by employing welfare recipients, participation rates
in SE are affected by the subsidy level.  Hence, the political process induces exogenous
variation in participation rates between regions, and this exogenous variation can be used
to identify the effect of SE on the exit rate from welfare.
In using this exogenous variation, we are confronted with a complication: the
difference in the  probability of leaving welfare between regions is not  exclusively
determined by the difference in the participation rates in SE.  It is well known that in the
period considered the labor market conditions in Flanders were more favorable than in
the Walloon provinces. To identify the effect of SE in the presence of regional effects on
the exit rate from welfare, we must make an additional assumption. To be specific, we
assume that the regional effects are identical for participants and non-participants, i.e. we
assume that there is no interaction between the region and the SE status.  Differences-in-
differences estimators require a similar lack of interaction between the treatment status
and the other stratification variable Krueger 1990, Angrist 1992, 1993).
4. The Data
We analyze administrative data on recipients of the MIG that has been collected since
June 1987 by the Ministry of Social Integration. From these data we can calculate the
length of welfare and SE spells for all MIG recipients, who claim benefits after  June 1st
1987.  In the analysis we consider only spells that have started in the period June 1987 -
July 1990.  On July 1st 1990 additional measures to stimulate the socio-professional
integration of welfare recipients were introduced. To obtain an estimate of the effect of
SE, we do not consider spells after this date. We only consider welfare recipients who
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were younger than fifty at the start of the welfare spell. For older recipients the
integration is less relevant.
Table 2 summarizes some characteristics of the population under consideration.
As the data were gathered for administrative  purposes and not for analysis, the
information is limited.  The first column refers to all welfare spells, the second refers to
those spells in which some period was spent in SE.
INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE
In contrast to Garcia (1990) we do not find an age difference between SE participants
and non-participants.  This is a consequence of the restriction to welfare recipients
younger than fifty.  On the other hand, the overrepresentation of women among the
socially employed is confirmed.  In addition,  individuals  who are legally  married but
living  alone, are overrepresented among the participants in SE.  Furthermore,
participants  are more likely to be responsible  for dependent children.  The rate of
participation in SE is larger in small municipalities and in Flanders.
A welfare spell is a spell during which the  recipient either receives welfare
benefits or is socially employed.  The median spell length is 5 months.  This is somewhat
smaller than the number reported in Cockx (1995).  The difference can be attributed to
the exclusion of  recipients older than fifty. Welfare spells of participants in SE are much
longer.  The median duration for this group is found to be 13 months. From this we
cannot conclude, that participation in SE increases welfare dependency.  Note that the
median duration until selection into SE is 6 months. However, even if we subtract the
time until selection, the  median  duration of participants (=13-6=7 months) exceeds
median duration of all welfare spells.  If the exit rate from welfare decreases with the
length of the spell, then this difference may be due to fact that post-SE welfare spells
start after some time in welfare and for that reason have lower exit rates. In other words,
participants have lower exit rates because of the time spent in welfare before selection
into SE.
5.  Dealing with Bias: Discrete Durations, Competing Risks and
Unobservables
In the previous section we noted that a direct comparison of the exit rates from welfare
between SE-participants and non-participants gives a biased estimate of the effect of SE.
The first bias is due to the combination of selection into SE during the welfare spell and
potential duration dependence of the exit rate.  In this section we introduce a model for
discrete duration data with competing risks that  deals with this bias. By including
observable characteristics of welfare recipients we also eliminate bias due to selection on
observables. In Section 3 we have argued that WA’s have an incentive to select relatively
productive welfare recipients into SE. It is clear  that WA’s  know more about these
recipients than we do: it is difficult to assess the productivity of the welfare recipient on
the basis of the few characteristics that we have at our disposal.  Hence, we expect that
selection into SE will be mainly on unobservables, and failure to correct for this selection
biases  the  estimate of the effect.  To deal with this selection  bias we allow for an
unobservable in the exit rate, just as in Amemiya and Nold’s (1975) grouped logit model.
This unobservable may differ between SE-participants and non-participants, as asserted-9- 9
in Section 3, but we assume that it does not differ, on average,  between regions. This
allows us to identify the effect of SE on the exit rate.
Durations can be modeled in continuous time or in discrete time. Following
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Cockx (1995) we choose a proportional hazards
model, which is a continuous-time model, but because our duration data are grouped, we
employ  the grouped proportional hazards model. This model allows for a flexible
specification of the duration dependence and gives, after a simple transformation of the
dependent variable,  a (heteroscedastic) linear regression model. It is straightforward to
include unobservables in such a model. In particular, we do not need any assumption on
the distribution of the unobservable, as required in models with continuously observed
durations.
5.1. Time-Varying Covariates and Competing Risks with Grouped Duration Data
Let the duration data be grouped into K+1 intervals: [t0,t1), ...., [tk−1,t k), ...,
[tK−1,tK), [tK,tK+1) of (possibly unequal) length Δ k = tk −tk−1 with t0 = 0, tK+1 =∞. In
the simplest grouped duration model it is assumed (Prentice and Gloeckler 1979) that the
(base-line) hazard λ is constant on these intervals
(5.1)  λ (t) =λ k  ,     tk-1 ≤ t < tk
Let d(t) be indicator of participation in SE at t. Note that the time-scale is the duration
of the welfare spell. The time origin is the start of the spell.  This is the time-scale used in
the rest of this paper.
If we assume that the effect of SE on the exit rate is independent of t, then the
exit rate h becomes
(5.2) h(t) = exp(αd(t))λ(t)
Let  P k be the conditional probability of exit in the k-th duration interval [tk−1,t k) given
that the individual is on welfare at tk−1. With (5.1) and (5.2) we have










This probability depends on the path of  d in the k-th duration interval. With grouped
duration data this path is unknown. Hence it seems that we must make an assumption on
this path. For instance, we may assume that exit from SE is only possible by leaving
welfare, and that all selection into SE occurs at time tk−1. Under these assumptions we
only need to know the SE-status at the start of the k-th interval to determine P k: the SE-
indicator is constant on the k-th interval.
Such an assumption is counterfactual, because individuals may leave SE and
remain on welfare, and they may be selected into SE at any point in the welfare spell. For
that reason we make an alternative assumption, which is in the spirit of (5.1). Let θ0(t),
θ1(t) be the transition intensities into and out of SE at welfare duration t. As in (5.1) we
assume that these intensities are piece-wise constant, and θ0k , θ1k are the values taken on-10- 10
the k-th interval. We condition on the SE-status at the beginning of the k-th interval. Let
P k
WSE ,OW  be the conditional probability of leaving welfare in the k-th duration interval and
being in SE until exit from welfare given that the individual is on welfare and in SE at
tk−1. Analogously, let P k
WNSE ,OW  be the conditional probability of leaving welfare in the k-
th duration interval and not being in SE until exit from welfare given that the individual is
on welfare and not in SE at tk−1. These probabilities are transition probabilities in the k-th
interval from the state ‘welfare with SE (WSE)’ to the state ‘out of welfare (OW)’ and
from the state ‘welfare without SE (WNSE)’ to the state ‘out-of-welfare (OW)’.  With
(5.1) and (5.2) we have
P k
WSE ,OW =λ k exp(α)exp −λk exp(α)s ()
0
Δk
∫ exp −θ1ks () ds
(5.4)
    =
λk exp(α)
λk exp(α) +θ 1k
1− exp −λk exp(α)Δ k −θ 1kΔk () []
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The conditional probability of all other events is the complement of the sum of these
probabilities.











1−exp −λkΔ k −θ0kΔ k () []
The expressions (5.4)-(5.7) show that our model  for  selection into SE is
equivalent to two competing risks models with piece-wise constant transition intensities:
one for the origin state WSE and destination states OW and WNSE, and one for the
origin state WNSE and destination states OW and WSE. Next, we discuss how we may
obtain a linear regression model, if we transform the transition probabilities on the left-
hand side of (5.4)-(5.7) appropriately.
5.2. Modeling Grouped Durations with Competing Risks
It will be convenient to attach numbers to the three states which were introduced in
Section 5.1
1. Welfare without SE-11- 11
2. Welfare with SE
3. Out of welfare
In the sequel we identify the states by these numbers. We are interested in comparing the
transition intensity from state 1 to state 3 with that from state 2 to state 3. This identifies
the effect of SE on the exit rate from welfare. State 3 is assumed to be an absorbing
state. Our data do not allow us to observe multiple welfare spells.
Origin/destination states are indicated by superscripts u, v and duration intervals
and types of individuals by subscripts k and m, respectively. We make the following
assumptions on the transition intensities between the states
(5.8) log hkm




uv ,   u= 1, 2,  v =1,2,3 ≠ u
There are K+1 duration intervals, where the last interval is open, and M types. The
duration effect γ k
v, and the type effect are  assumed to depend only on the destination
state, i.e. they are the same for SE-participants and non-participants. We normalize the
type effects and set β1
v = 0.  The parameter α
uv  gives the effect of SE on the exit rate
from welfare. The effect is assumed to be independent of the type m. By definition
α
12 =α
21 = 0, and by normalization α
13 = 0. Note that α
23  is the parameter of interest.
Finally, the  εkm
uv  are unobserved variables, which are similar to the specification errors
introduced by Amemiya and Nold (1975) in their grouped logit model (see also Parks
1980). If we consider these unobserved variables as parameters, we obtain a saturated
model. In the sequel we impose restrictions on the unobserved variables, by assuming
that they are draws from some distribution that does not depend on some of its indices.
The  specification in (5.8) is a proportional hazards  model  for the continuous-time
transition intensities. These are assumed to be constant on the duration intervals.
The  specification allows for  unobserved heterogeneity in the transition
intensities. Unobservables may be important determinants of the transition intensities,
because the number of included observed characteristics is small. Because unobservables
may also be important for the selection into SE and correlation between unobservables in
the transition intensities and in the selection process biases the estimate of the SE-effect,
we must assess their contribution to the explanation of the transition intensities. Because
the data are categorized, the unobservables vary between, but not within groups. Hence,
the analogy between the group-specific unobserved heterogeneity in our model and the
individual unobserved heterogeneity in continuously observed duration data is imperfect.
Under these assumptions the transition probability  P km
uv , i.e. the probability  of a
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⎟  ,   u= 1,2, v = 1,2,3 ≠ u
This expression maps transition intensities to transition probabilities. The  inverse




uv log P km
uu ()







⎟ = log hkm
uv ()  ,   u = 1,2, v = 1,2,3 ≠ u
with
(5.11) P km





the probability of staying in u in the k-th interval.
Let rkm
u  be the number of individuals of type m in state u at the start of duration
interval k, i.e. at time tk−1, and let qkm
uv  of these individuals make a transition from state u
to state v in the k-th duration interval. Then we estimate P km
uv  by





u ,   u= 1,2, v =1,2,3 ≠ u
 
Upon substitution of these estimates in the middle expression of (5.10), we obtain  ˆ  z  km
uv  .
If in (5.10) we replace the transition probabilities by their estimates, then the second
equality does not hold exactly. However, a Taylor series expansion around P km
uv  yields
(5.13) ˆ  z  km
uv = log(hkm
uv )+ ukm
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and δvw  the Kronecker delta.
Conditional on rkm
u   the random vector of the number of transitions of individuals
of type m from u to states v ≠ u in the k-th interval has a multinomial distribution with
parameters rkm
u  and P km
u  , which is the vector of transition probabilities from state u to
states v ≠ u in interval k  for type m. Hence, we have for all k, m, and u =1,2
(5.16) E(ukm
u ) = 0
The disturbance in (5.13)  has expectation 0. The variance-covariance matrix of the
vector ukm
u  has typical element-13- 13
skm
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with v, w = 1,2,3 ≠ u, and where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution
of  rkm
u  . A consistent estimate is obtained by omitting the expectation and replacing the
transition probabilities by their estimates.
Upon substitution of (5.8) into (5.13) we obtain a linear regression model. More
precisely, we obtain for each origin  state  u =1,2 two regression equations that
correspond to the two destination states v =1,2,3 ≠ u





uv + u km
uv ,    v= 1,2, 3 ≠ u, u= 1,2
We assume that the 4xMxK unobserved variables are random variables14  with a joint
distribution such that
(5.19) E ε km
uv () = 0   
(5.20) E εkm
uvε ′  k  ′  m 
′  u w () =δk ′  k δm ′  m δ u ′  u σ
uvw
The unobserved variables corresponding to different duration classes, types, and origin
states are assumed to be independent. The unobserved variables  corresponding to
different destination states may be correlated. Note that the disturbances ukm
uv   have the
same pattern of zero correlations. Hence for origin state u and for duration interval k and
type m, the distribution of the 2-vector of disturbances of the two regression equations
(5.18) with v =1,2,3 ≠ u, vkm
u , which is the sum of the unobserved group effect and the
approximation error has a variance-covariance matrix with typical element σ
uvw + skm
uvw
with  v, w = 1,2,3 ≠ u. We denote this 2x2 matrix by V km
u . This completes the
specification of the regression equations.
The regression equations (5.18) are a set of equations with heteroscedastic and
correlated disturbances. Under assumption (5.19) which in particular implies that there
are no unobserved differences in the exit rates of SE-participants  (u = 2,v= 3) and non-
participants (u =1,v = 3), we can estimate the parameters of these equations by OLS, or
more efficiently by GLS. Because we do not observe the transitions that occur in the
open K+1-th duration interval, we omit the regression equations that correspond to that
interval. As a result, we have MxKx2x2 equations. If we order the regressions by m, k, u,
v, in this order, we obtain a block-diagonal variance-covariance matrix of the MxKx2x2
vector of disturbances with the diagonal blocks being 2x2 matrices V km
u .
The feasible GLS procedure consists of two steps. In the first step we use OLS to
estimate  the 3xK+3x(M-1)+1 parameters γ k
v,k=1,￿,K,v= 1,2,3 ,
                                               
14  The assumption that the omitted variables are random is analogous to the treatment of unobserved
heterogeneity in duration (and other) model. The expectation is with respect to the distribution of the
omitted variables.-14- 14
βm
v ,m= 2,￿,M,v= 1,2,3, and α
23 . Next, we estimate the 2x2 variance-covariance
matrix of the unobserved group effects by
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with  ˆ  v  km
uv the residuals of the regression (5.18),  and  ˆ  s  km
uvw the estimate of (5.17).
Substitution of this consistent estimate gives a consistent estimate of V km
u , which is used
in the second step of the feasible GLS procedure.
Because we have grouped data, we can use a χ
2-goodness-of-fit test to evaluate
the specification of the model. Let  ˆ  v  be the 4KM-vector of residuals of the regression
equation  (5.18) ordered by k,  m,  u,  v, in that order. Let the estimated variance-
covariance matrix of the disturbances in (5.18) be denoted by  ˆ  V .  This is a block
diagonal matrix, which simplifies the computation of its inverse. Under the assumption
that the model is correctly specified we have that  ˆ  ′  v  ˆ  V 
−1ˆ  v  follows a χ
2-distribution with
4KM-3K-3(M-1)-1 degrees of freedom.
5.3. Estimation Results
The estimation results for model (5.18) are reported in Table 3. Durations are measured
in months. For the duration intervals we have chosen {[0,3), [3,6), [6,12), [12,24)}.
There are three types that correspond to the three regions: Flanders, Walloon Provinces
and Brussels. Hence, M = 3,K = 4, so that we have 48 empirical hazard estimates and
19 regression parameters.
INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE
The estimator (5.21) gives negative estimates for the variances of the unobserved group
effects  corresponding to the transitions from state 1 tot state 2 and from state 2 to state
1. Following Parks (1980, p.299, footnote 5) we set these variances to 0. Hence, these
unobserved group effects are set to 0, and we have σ
123 =σ
213 = 0. We only find an
unobserved group effect in the transitions from welfare with SE and welfare without SE
to out-of welfare.
Table 2 above suggested that SE decreases the exit rate from welfare. Table 3,
which corrects for the timing of selection and the resultant lower exit rate due to the
duration dependence of the exit rate, leads to the opposite conclusion: participation in
SE increases the exit rate. Indeed, we find that the exit rate from welfare decreases
significantly with the time spent in welfare, which explains the change in sign of the SE
effect. Before we accept this result, we must control for the potential selectivity of the
selection into SE. It may be that the unobserved characteristics of the participants are
more favorable to exit than those of the non-participants. As argued in Section 2 WA’s
have an incentive to select welfare recipients with favorable characteristics. If this is true,
then the distribution of  the unobserved determinants of the exit rates εkm
uv  depends on the
transition. In particular, creaming implies that E(εkm
23 ) > E(εkm
13 ), and as a result the effect
of participation in SE is overestimated.-15- 15
Note that the goodness-of-fit test leads to a rejection of the model. Therefore, in
Table 4 we let the SE-effect depend on the duration interval k. This is a deviation from
the  usual  proportional hazards specification, where such a dependence is excluded.
However, it is well-known, e.g.  Lancaster  (1990, p.64-65), that within-group
heterogeneity makes the SE-effect duration dependent. More specifically, within-group
heterogeneity  induces a trend toward 0 in this effect. Hence, making  the SE-effect
dependent on k provides a check on the presence of within-group heterogeneity.
INSERT TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE
There is another reason that the SE-effect may depend on k. In (5.8) the duration is the
time spent in welfare, with or without SE. If the WA benefits from employing welfare
recipients, it is likely that it discourages short spells in SE. The duration-dependent SE-
effect captures the dependence of the exit rate from welfare with SE on the time spent in
SE.  The estimation results show that the goodness-of-fit test does not reject the model,
and that the effect of SE increases with k. This is consistent with dependence on the time
spent in SE, but not with within-group unobserved heterogeneity. In the sequel we are
concerned with the average effect of SE during a spell in SE, and hence we shall only
report the results with the SE-effect independent of k.
5.4. Correcting for Selection on Unobservables
In Section 5.1 we assumed that the omitted variables in the transition  intensities are
uncorrelated  with participation in SE.  Of course, this assumption is automatically
satisfied, if there are no omitted variables.  However, the estimates of σ
u33,u =1,2
indicate that for the relevant transition intensities there are unobserved group effects.
Hence, the estimated effect of SE in Table 3 may be biased because of the correlation
between these unobservables and the SE indicator. In particular, if the WA’s have indeed
an incentive to select the most productive welfare recipients into SE, we expect that
E(εkm
23 ) > E(εkm
13 ).
In our model,  the  εkm
uv  are unobserved group effects.  Because we observe all
welfare spells that start between June 1 1987 and July 1 1990, the frequency of εkm
uv  in the
population is known and given by fkm
u .  Hence, we have
(5.22)   E(εkm







Note that the expectation in (5.22) is the average over all individuals that entered welfare
in the observation period. It should be distinguished from the expectation with respect to
the distribution of the unobserved group effects, that reflects our uncertainty with respect
to the value taken by εkm
uv  for a particular k, m, u, v. Taking the conditional expectation
on both sides of the regression (5.18) we obtain, using (5.22)-16- 16
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In (5.23)  ff km km
2  is the fraction of welfare recipients in k, m that participate in SE. To
estimate  α
23 from this regression we must restrict the ηkm  . In (5.23) the ηkm  are
unrestricted interaction effects, that can not be distinguished from  fkm
2 fkm . In the sequel
we assume that the ηkm  are draws from a distribution with (here the expectation reflects
again our uncertainty with respect to the value taken by ηkm )
(5.24)   E ηkm () =μ k,         Var ηkm () =σ
33
Without loss of generality we can set the μk equal to 0 by adding these to the duration
effects γ k
3. The substantive assumption embodied in (5.24) is that E(ηkm ) = E(ηk ′  m  ), i.e.
on average ηkm  does not depend on m 15 . In Section 3 we argued that the variation in the
participation in SE between regions reflects exogenous differences in the political
preference for SE. If that is correct, then (5.24) is satisfied. Hence, we can treat the ηkm
in the same way as the unobserved group effects in the regression (5.18).
In (5.18) we have four regression equations for each k, m.  In (5.23) two of those
are combined, so that we have in total 3xKxM equations. If we order these equations by
m, k and for each such pair in the order transition from 1 to 2, from 2 to 1, combined 1

































In the two-step procedure we first use OLS to estimate the residuals. Next,  σ
122 and
σ
211 are estimated as in (5.21). If we denote the OLS residuals of (5.23) by  ˆ  v  km
3 , then we
have
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with an analogous estimator for σ
213, and
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15  This assumption can be relaxed. The SE effect  can be identified, if we assume  that
E(ηkm ) =μ k +μ m. This is also a necessary condition for identification.-17- 17
In the second step we estimate the variance matrix (5.25) and estimate the parameters by
GLS.
Our  estimation  procedure  based on (5.23)  can be compared with the 2SLS
procedure. With 2SLS the endogenous regressor is replaced by its projection on the
exogenous variables. Of course, in (5.23) this projection is  fkm
2 fkm . Note that in (5.23)
the dependent variable is also projected on the exogenous variables, which explains why
the usual distribution theory for 2SLS does not apply.
The GLS estimates for regression (5.23)  and the regressions for the other
transitions  are reported in Table 5. A comparison with the results in Table 3 shows, that
the parameter estimates for the destination states ‘welfare without SE’ and ‘welfare with
SE’ are almost identical in the two tables. Also the duration effects in the transition
intensity to the state ‘out-of-welfare’ do not differ by much between these tables. The
only significant differences are in the region effects and the effect of SE. Eliminating
unobserved differences between the SE-participants and the non-participants makes the
transition  intensity to the state ‘out-of-welfare’  significantly smaller in the  Walloon
provinces as compared to Flanders. More importantly, the effect of SE is negative (and
insignificant) in Table 5, while it was significantly positive in Table 3. We conclude that
the latter effect is due to selection of welfare recipients with favorable prospects into SE.
INSERT TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Note that the chi-square test does not reject the model in Table 5 against the
saturated  model. After correction for differences in the  unobservables,  there is no
evidence of  non-proportionality as in Table 4.
6. The Effect of Temporal Aggregation
The methods used in this paper rely on grouping of durations in a relatively small number
of intervals. Although the models for the transition intensities allow for an interpretation
in continuous time, the specification of the duration dependence may be coarse with a
few duration intervals. For that reason, we estimate (5.23) and the regressions for the
other two transition intensities with 8 instead of 4 duration intervals. The results are
reported in Table 6.
INSERT TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Upon  comparison with the estimates of Table 5 we conclude, that  only the
estimates of the duration effects  differ  between these two  tables. In particular, the
estimate of the SE-effect is similar to that in Table 5. Note that the model is rejected
against the saturated model. If we allow the duration effects to be different in Brussels
we obtain a specification that is not rejected. The estimated SE-effect is virtually
identical to that in Table 6.
We conclude that the estimate of the SE-effect is robust  under temporal
aggregation.
7. Conclusion-18- 18
In this paper we estimate the effect of  participation in social employment (SE) on
welfare  duration in Belgium.  For this purpose we extend the minimum  chi-square
approach that Cockx (1995) proposed for the analysis of grouped duration data.  First,
we show that the time-varying participation in SE can be modeled in a competing risks
framework. Secondly, by allowing for a specification error, that captures the effect of
unobservables on the  transition  rates, we can allow for  selectivity  with  respect to
participation in SE. Finally, if we assume  that the unobserved  group  effects  are on
average the same in all duration intervals, we can project the participation dummy and
the dependent variable on the region, to obtain an estimate of the SE-effect corrected for
non-random selection into SE.
In Belgium the level of the subsidy to SE varies between regions in a way that is
unrelated to the variable of interest,  i.e. the probability of leaving welfare.  As this
subsidy is likely to affect the rates of participation in SE, this variation in the subsidy
level can be viewed as exogenous.  This exogenous variation enables us to identify the
effect of SE with minimal parametric assumptions.  As such, we comply with LaLonde's
(1986), and Fraker and Maynard's (1987) critique on the non-experimental evaluation
methodology.
The estimation results can be summarized as follows16 .  If we correct for
selection on observables only  (Section 5.3, Table 3) participation in SE reduces the
median  welfare  spell from 13.1 to 11.6 months17 . The corresponding coefficient is
significantly different from 0.  If we correct for selection on unobservables, we find
evidence for substantial creaming in the selection process.  Participation in SE is now
found to reduce the exit rate from welfare, be it that the effect is not  significantly
different from 0.  The median  duration of a welfare spell is 12.5  months for non-
participants and 14.8 months for participants in SE.
These results are in line with the expectations.  As argued in Section 2, welfare
agencies (WA) face adverse incentives.  Since the welfare recipient who is in SE will
eventually  become entitled to unemployment benefits, and  will  therefore no longer
depend on the WA, the WA has no incentive to enhance the professional integration of
the participants in SE.  Moreover, since the SE is heavily subsidized, the WA has an
incentive to enroll welfare recipients into the program and to keep them employed in
order to do jobs requiring few qualifications at a very low cost.  The more the WA
selects the most productive welfare recipients, the more it can profit from this program.
With the current incentives to the WA’s it is very unlikely that the welfare recipient gain
from participation in SE.
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Table 1:  The Proportion of the Regional Fund allocated to SE





1986-1988 0% 10% 0% 0%
1989-1991 0% 15% 5% 5.5%
1992 0% 18% 6% 6%
Source: Berger (1987-92) and O.C.M.W.-Visies (1993).-23- 23
Table 2:  Population characteristics
all welfare spells
(including SE)
spells with some time in
SE
number of spells 80,621 2,813




   dependent children present 39.2% 51.7%
   number of children 1.8 1.8
Marital status
   unmarried 45.3% 37.5%
   married 30.6% 38.5%
   widow(er) 1.2% 0.6%
   divorced 22.8% 23.4%
Household type
   living alone 69.5% 73.1%
   married / cohabiting. 10.1% 9.8%
   unmarred / cohabiting 20.4% 17.2%
Region
   Flanders 39.4% 59.4%
   Walloon Provinces 47.0% 25.7%
   Brussels 13.6% 14.9%
Size of municipality
   > 100,000 36.0% 28.4%
   50-100,000 18.3% 18.1%
   < 50,000 45.7% 53.5%
Welfare spells (months)
   median welfare duration 4.9 13.1
   median SE duration - 6.3
   median duration until SE - 6.0-24- 24
Table 3:  GLS estimates of the parameters of the transition intensities 






3: Out of welfare
Duration interval
(months)
   0-3  (γ1
v)      -3.307***
(.210)
      -4.977***
(.064)
      -1.838***
(.095)






     -.341***
(.108)
   6-12 (γ 3
v −γ1




      -.465***
(.107)
   12-24 (γ 4
v −γ1




      -.579***
(.109)
Region
   Walloon Prov. (β2
v)      .448**
(.184)




   Brussels (β3
v) -.364
(.318)





   α
23 - -     .224**
(.093)
Unobserved vars.
    ˆ  σ 
1vw 0 - 0.00868
   
ˆ  σ 







*     significant at the 10% level
**   significant at the 5% level
*** significant at the 1% level-25- 25
Table 4:  GLS estimates of the parameters of the transition intensities: SE effect 






3: Out of welfare
Duration interval
(months)
   0-3  (γ1
v)      -3.091***
(.120)
      -4.977***
(.041)
      -1.790***
(.064)






     -.312***
(.078)
   6-12 (γ 3
v −γ1




      -.510***
(.078)
   12-24 (γ 4
v −γ1




      -.779***
(.079)
Region
   Walloon Prov. (β2
v)       .462***
(.117)




   Brussels (β3
v) -.350*
(.202)






   0-3 (α1
23) - - -.020
(.119)
   3-6 (α2
23) - - -.165
(.121)
   6-12 (α3
23) - -  .197*
(.113)
   12-24(α4
23) - -       .894***
(.120)
Unobserved vars.
    ˆ  σ 
1vw 0 - 0.00868
    ˆ  σ 







*     significant at the 10% level
**   significant at the 5% level
*** significant at the 1% level-26- 26
Table 5:  GLS estimates of the parameters of the transition intensities with 
participation rate in SE instead of participation indicator






3: Out of welfare
Duration interval
(months)
   0-3  (γ1
v)      -3.095***
(.13)
     -4.976***
(.044)
      -1.716 ***
(.028)






     -.321***
(.025)
   6-12 (γ 3
v −γ1




      -.510***
(.033)
   12-24 (γ 4
v −γ1




      -.710***
(.051)
Region
   Walloon Prov. (β2
v)       .469***
(.127)
      -1.191***
(.059)
   -.116***
(.033)
   Brussels (β3
v) -.349
(.219)





   α
23 - - -.256
(.805)
Unobserved vars
    ˆ  σ 
1vw 0- -
   
ˆ  σ 
2vw -0 -
   
ˆ  σ 







*     significant at the 10% level
**   significant at the 5% level
*** significant at the 1% level-27- 27
Table 6:  GLS estimates of the parameters of the transition intensities with 
participation rate in SE instead of participation indicator: 8 






3: Out of welfare
Duration interval
(months)
   0-3  (γ1
v)    -3.103***
(.148)
      -4.977***
 (0.052)
    -1.706***
(.015)






      -.335***
(.015)






      -.619***
(.023)






      -.532***
(.027)






     -.868***
(.036)






      -.975***
(.042)






      -.977***
(.047)






      -.936***
(.053)
Region
   Walloon Prov. (β2
v)      .472***
(.119)
   -1.180***
(.069)
      -.112***
(.017)








     α








*     significant at the 10% level
**   significant at the 5% level
*** significant at the 1% level